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Abstract
This study distinguishes between industrial policy that stimulates
incumbent industry development, ‘pro-business policy’, and industrial
policy that promotes the development of free markets, ‘pro-market
policy’. We find that there is a positive relation between the level of
countries’ implementation of these policies. However, we find opposite
effects of pro-business and pro-market policies when estimating the
policy effect on growth and income level. Pro-business policy has a
positive effect on economic development, and pro-market policy has a
negative effect on economic development.
Keywords: Industrial Policy, Growth
JEL Classification: L50, O11, O25, O43
∗This study benefited from collaboration with the French Ministry for the Economy,
Industry and Employment (MINEIE), the French Development Agency (AFD), and from
suggestions by Denis de Crombrugghe and Bart Verspagen. The views expressed in this
paper are the views of the author and do not necessarily represent views or policies of
UNU-MERIT, MGSoG, AFD, and other affiliated institutions. All remaining errors are
those of the author.
†Maastricht University, the Netherlands. E-mail: kristine.farla@maastrichtuniversity.nl
1
1 Introduction
Endogenous growth theory generally predicts that market liberalization, dereg-
ulation, openness, and competition are key to growth. Policies that favor
given sectors or industries are generally criticized for inducing firms to lose
competitive drive and lower investment. However, scholars find that the re-
lation between industrial policy and industrial development is ambiguous.
For example, Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005) find that
competition creates both incentives and disincentives for innovation. Ace-
moglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) show that low competition may have
negative long-run effects and may prevent catch-up. Nevertheless, Acemoglu
et al. (2006) also show that countries at early stages of development may ben-
efit from anticompetitive policy that protects or supports incumbent industry
development and, as a result, may experience faster growth and technologi-
cal convergence. Following Khan (2008, p. 57), in Pakistan, “protection and
subsidies proved to be extremely effective in driving investment in sectors
that had previously been neglected”, and “import substitution, as a method
of developing new capabilities, was initially extremely successful in both In-
dia and Pakistan.” To what extent is industrial policy aimed at supporting
existing industry competitiveness? Is such policy important for growth? This
study is an analysis of countries’ industrial policy package and the relation
between industrial policy and growth.
Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) find that in India high levels of growth in
the 1980’s were triggered by ‘pro-business’ rather than ‘pro-market’ policy.1
The authors define pro-business policies as policies that support the develop-
ment of existing industry and are “aimed primarily at benefiting incumbents
in the formal industrial commercial sector” (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005,
p. 215).2 Furthermore, the authors define pro-market polices as policies
that are aimed at stimulating competition and benefit new entrants and con-
sumers.
Khan and Blankenburg (2009) distinguish industrial policy using two pol-
icy groups: strong and targeted policy and weak and horizontal policy. The
first group comprises policies that target firms or sectors to enable these
to become competitive. The second group comprises policies that sustain
productivity in competitive markets and thereby discourage permanent rent-
1Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) study the variation in political alliances between
state governments and the Indian national government and interpret this as a proxy for
an attitudinal shift toward pro-business policy.
2Pro-business policy is closely related to the infant industry protection argument: pro-
tect weak industries throughout initial capacity development stages so that, in the future,
the industries can operate in a competitive market.
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seeking behaviour. This distinction of policy is similar to the work of Rodrik
and Subramanian (2005). The description of the first group of policies is
alike to that of pro-business type policies, and the description of the second
group is alike to that of pro-market type policies.
Building on the argument of Khan and Blankenburg (2009), a possible sce-
nario is that countries’ policy emphasis shifts from pro-business to pro-market
policy as industrial development ‘catches up’. Following Khan and Blanken-
burg (2009), the first stage of industrial development requires pro-business
type policies that protect the incumbent industries’ knowledge acquisition.
The second phase of industry development requires pro-market type poli-
cies that increase market competition with the aim to spread innovation and
technology and set-off a Schumpeterian process of creative destruction (Khan
and Blankenburg, 2009). In fact, scholars argue that competition policy is
only enforced gradually (Possas and Borges, 2009). Pro-business policy may
also function as a short-run solution to market failure in countries with a
relatively weak institutional setting. And countries with formalized property
rights and contracting institutions may require relatively less pro-business
policy.
If industrial development is steered by the sequential implementation of
pro-business and pro-market policy, there is a trade-off between these poli-
cies. An example of a trade-off between pro-market and pro-business policy is
the following: export subsidies are implemented with the aim to support the
domestic industry to become competitive with the foreign market. However,
WTO agreements prohibit the use of export subsidies. Rodrik and Subrama-
nian (2005) describe pro-market and pro-business policy as opposing policy
packages.
This study is motivated by the theoretical advancements of North, Wal-
lis, and Weingast (2009) who argue that elite distribute rents in order to
maintain political stability and hence, elite prosperity. Both pro-market and
pro-business policy are sources of rent distribution. For example, market
liberalization and privatization have re-distributed large rents to elite under
the pretext of market development (Schamis, 2002). Also, an absence of anti-
competition policy can be explained by pressures from economic elite inter-
ested in securing industry dominance (Acemoglu et al., 2006). Pro-business
policy reform has been used to gain political support from the private sector
(Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005).
We investigate the extent to which there is a trade-off between pro-
business and pro-market policy and analyze the relationship between coun-
tries’ industrial development path and economic performance. In this study,
we differentiate between pro-market and pro-business type policies on the
basis of a cross-country analysis. We relax the assumptions of pro-market
3
and pro-business policy as described by Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) and
analyze policy data with an open mind. On the basis of qualitative pol-
icy data, we find that it is possible to distinguish between pro-market and
pro-business type policies, and we construct a measurement for each pol-
icy type. The two policy measures are positively correlated across countries
and over time. Based upon this observation, it appears that pro-market
and pro-business policies form a compatible policy package. We run fixed
effects regressions using data from 1995-2009 and 56 countries to test the
effect of pro-market and pro-business policy on growth and income. Whilst
pro-business policy is positively related to growth and income, pro-market
policy has a negative impact on economic performance.
2 Empirical Approach
2.1 Industrial Policy Indicators
Industrial policy covers a broad range of policies. For example, Di Maio
(2009) describes industrial policy as including the following policies: innova-
tion and technology, education and skills formation, trade, targeted industry
support measures, competitiveness, and competition regulation. We are in-
terested in policy data that covers a broad range of industrial policy aspects.
We use survey data from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook
(IMD), hereafter referred to as WCY, because the data has a broad range of
variables that describe policy that targets the private sector. This selection
of policy variables is listed in Table 8 in the appendix.3 The WCY survey
data covers 59 countries and includes data for the years 1995-2011. The
countries included in the WCY dataset are listed in Table 7 in the appendix.
We analyze the selection of WCY policy data with the intention to iden-
tify a pattern for the pro-business and / or pro-market policy variables. This
analysis is done on the basis of principal component analysis (PCA). A PCA
is run on the WCY policy indicators for the years 2007-2011, and two prin-
cipal components (PCs) are retained. We retain two PCs because we are
interested in identifying two policy domains. We retain this selection of
years because prior years contain more missing observations. For the years
3The WCY survey data is collected with the intention to describe the degree of com-
petitiveness of countries. The WCY survey is sent to executives working in a range of
sectors. The sample size of each country is proportional to the countries’ GDP. Data is
collected during the period January to April. In 2011, the WCY collected 4,935 surveys
(IMD, 2011). Survey respondents are asked to make a country assessment on the basis of
a scale of 1 to 6. The WCY presents the average country score per variable on a scale of
0 to 10, where 10 is associated with high competitiveness.
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2007-2011, the following countries have missing observations for one or more
years: United Arab Emirates for 2007-2010, Peru for 2007, Iceland for 2009,
Kazakhstan for 2007, and Qatar for 2007-2008.4 In order to facilitate the
interpretation of the PCs, the PCs are rotated using varimax rotation which
computes orthogonal factors. The first PC contains 40% of the total varia-
tion, and the second PC contains 30% of the total variation. The loadings
of the PCA are presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Analysis of Policy Indicators
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Results of Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation (59 countries)
PC 1 PC 2
PC 1 loads high on the variables Labour, Environment, Ventures, Cre-
ation, Funding, Research, Legal, Tax, Ease, and Regulation. This PC also
loads relatively high on the variables Framework and Exchange in compari-
son to the loadings of PC 2. PC 1 loads high on policy variables that support
technological advancement and knowledge accumulation. PC 1 loads strongly
on variables that describe the ease of access to funds to finance research and
technological development. PC 1 also loads strongly on variables that sup-
port the existing industry competitiveness and development. These policies
4The total number of observations used in the PCA is 286.
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support industry that otherwise may be under-invested. PC 1 is a proxy for
the following concepts: pro-business policy (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005)
and strong and targeted policy (Khan and Blankenburg, 2009).
PC 2 loads high on the variables Subsidies, Competition, Customs, Mar-
ket, Investor, Contract, and Protection. Moreover, the loadings of the vari-
ables Ownership, Incentive and Immigration are relatively higher for PC 2
than for PC 1. PC 2 summarizes a group of variables that describe market
liberalization, competition policy and deregulation. PC 2 describes regula-
tions that are aimed at stimulating a free market economy. PC 2 is a proxy for
the following concepts: pro-market policy (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005)
and weak and horizontal policy (Khan and Blankenburg, 2009).
Figure 2 presents a scatter plot of PC 1 and PC 2.5 The scatter plot gives
a first indication of the extent to which a country scores relatively higher on
pro-business policy rather than on pro-market policy. For example, Malaysia,
Iceland, and Singapore score relatively higher on PC 1. Chile, New Zealand,
and Ireland score relatively higher on PC 2.
Figure 2: Analysis of Policy Indicators
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The orthogonality of these indicators inhibits their comparability with
alternative indicators and does not allow for the study of countries’ ‘natu-
ral’ scores. Moreover, we are interested in studying the policy data for the
years 1995-2011. Therefore, the results from the PCA with varimax rota-
tion are merely used to separate the policy dataset into two policy domains:
pro-market and pro-business. Next, we calculate the average score of the
pro-market policy variables and of the pro-business policy variables for each
country and year; missing values are ignored. Finally, the indicators are
normalized on a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 is associated with more implemen-
tation of pro-market and pro-business policy. Hereafter, these indicators are
referred to as pro-market and pro-business. The average scores over time of
the resulting policy indicators are illustrated in Figure 3. Whereas Figure 2
shows the relation between orthogonal policy indicators, Figure 3 shows the
relation between non-orthogonal policy indicators.
Figure 3: Analysis of Policy Indicators
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Following Figure 3, pro-market and pro-business policy appear to be pos-
itively correlated. We find no evidence that, on average, countries that are
in a catch-up stage implement relatively more pro-business policies. Instead,
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Figure 3 suggests that pro-market and pro-business policies are complemen-
tary. We expect that countries that score in the upper-right corner of Figure
3 have relatively more policy space.6 Furthermore, the close correlation be-
tween the policy indicators suggests that countries maximize both policy
domains in accordance to countries’ stage of catch-up.
Figure 4 presents the results of a rough assessment of the relation between
policy and countries’ institutional development. Measures of property rights
protection and corruption are used as proxy for countries’ institutional devel-
opment.7 The indicator for property rights has a scale of 0-1, where higher
scores are associated with a high degree of property rights protection. The
indicator for corruption also has a scale of 0-1, where higher scores are asso-
ciated with freedom from corruption.
The scatter plots in Figure 4 show similar relationships between the policy
indicators and the institutional indicators. We find that pro-market and pro-
business policy has a positive and overall linear relation with property rights
protection and corruption. As such, countries with a formalized institutional
setting are expected to implement relatively more industrial policy. We find
no evidence that states implement pro-business policy to overcome market
failure in countries with relatively weak institutions. On the contrary, The
scatter plots in Figure 4 suggest that countries’ institutional setting plays
an important role in defining a countries’ policy space and hence, the imple-
mentation of a given policy package.
6Countries policy space represents the choice spectrum a country has in deciding upon
effective policy instruments.
7Data on property rights and corruption is from the Heritage Foundation. For the
data sample of the WCY policy data, the average scores of the property rights and cor-
ruption data are calculated for each year. However, the property rights and corruption
indicator have missing observations for Iceland for the years 1995-1996. And the following
countries have missing observations for the year 1995: Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Switzerland, New Zealand, Luxembourg, Finland, and Denmark. The property rights and
corruption indicators are normalized on a scale of 0 to 1.
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Figure 4: Institutions and Policy
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Figure 5 illustrates countries’ scores on the policy indicators in 2011.
Likewise, as in Figure 3, pro-market and pro-business policy have a strong
linear relation. Correlation between these indicators in this year is 0.82. Fig-
ure 6 illustrates the association between pro-market and pro-business policy
for the year 1995. The correlation between the pro-market and pro-business
indicators in year 1995 is 0.38. Figure 6 illustrates that in 1995 the coun-
tries in the lower-right corner, e.g. Japan, Malaysia, Korea, Switzerland, and
Brazil, had a stronger emphasis on pro-business policy than on pro-market
policy. However, in 2011, (Figure 5) this observation is no longer valid. In
1995, few countries scored high on the pro-business indicator. The overall
dispersion of countries on the pro-business policy indicator is lower in Figure
6 than in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Analysis of Policy Indicators
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Figure 6: Analysis of Policy Indicators
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2.2 Variation in Industrial Policy Development
This section presents the scores on the pro-market and pro-business indica-
tors over the years 1995-2011 for a selection of countries. Figure 7 displays
the scores for the countries Brazil, Russia, India, and China and, Figure 8
displays the scores for the countries South Korea, Singapore, Honk Kong
and Taiwan. We present the scores for the ‘BRIC’ countries because these
countries can be perceived to be at similar stages of economic development.
Moreover, we present the scores for the ‘Asian Tigers’ because this group of
countries experienced high growth rates since the 1960s.
Based upon this selection of countries, it appears that the policy indica-
tors move closely together over time. One exception is the converging trend
we observe for India, Russia and China during the 1995-1998. Furthermore,
the policy indicators are relatively stable, and during the period 1995-2011
the countries generally move within a 20% bandwidth. Policy changes appear
to be representative of countries’ de-facto policy environment and appear less
related to changes in e.g. competition law.
Figure 7: Policy Indicators over Time
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Amongst the BRIC countries, the country that scores lowest on both pro-
business and pro-market policy is Russia. India has an increasing trend in
pro-business policy for the years 1995-2006. On average, Brazil’s score on
the policy indicators follows a decreasing trend. In particular, since 1996,
Brazil scores relatively higher on pro-market than on pro-business policy.
Hong Kong and Singapore have a stable score on both pro-market and pro-
business policy and score relatively higher on the policy indicators than the
BRIC countries.
Figure 8: Policy Indicators over Time
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2.3 Validity of Policy Indicators
The two policy domains constructed on the basis of data from WCY are
compared with alternative policy indicators. We select variables from the
Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) 2009 that are conceptually close to
the variable selection of the WCY dataset. The policy indicators from the
IPD are listed in Table 9 in the appendix. Based on the policy domains
constructed for the WCY dataset, the IPD variable selection is sorted in
order to describe either pro-business or pro-market policy.
12
We use Canonical Correlation Analysis (CCA) to compare the variable
selection from the WCY with the variable selection from IPD. We assume
that countries’ score on pro-market and pro-business policy is relatively con-
stant over time and therefore use the IPD data from 2009 and WCY data
from the years 2007-2011. The CCA is based on 272 sample observations
and 56 countries. Unlike the sample used for the PCA in section 2.1, the
countries Croatia, Iceland, and Luxembourg are excluded in the CCA due to
missing observations in the IPD 2009 dataset. The results of the CCA are
presented in Figures 9 and 10. We focus on the first and second linear com-
bination. The Pearson canonical correlations of the first and second linear
combination are 0.9 and 0.85.8
The raw coefficients of the first two linear combination of the CCA are
presented in Figure 9. The raw coefficients are interpreted as the effect of a
one unit increase in a variable on the corresponding canonical variate. We
cannot identify a pattern across the pro-market and/or pro-business policy
variables based on the first linear combination and the raw coefficients. The
second linear combination does identify some pro-business variables from the
WCY dataset that are positively associated with pro-business variables from
the IPD dataset. The pro-business variable that describes the availability
of funding for technological development (Funding) has a very high posi-
tive loading compared to the other variables in the WCY data. Also, in
descending order, Framework, Research, and Environment have a positive
loading and have previously been identified as pro-business variables. The
three variables that have the highest positive loading amongst the IPD vari-
ables are classified under pro-business policy. These three variables describe
government support for research and development (A5033), institutions that
support research and technological acquisitions for SMEs (B5010), and gov-
ernment venture capital initiatives (C5010). The variables that have high
negative loadings include both pro-business and pro-market variables.
8The Wilks lambda, Pillai’s trace, Lawley-Hotelling trace, and Roy’s largest root tests
are all significant at a 1% level.
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The loadings resulting from the CCA are presented in Figure 10. Follow-
ing Rencher (1992), the canonical loadings represent the correlation of the
variables with their corresponding linear combination (canonical variate).
The canonical loadings include less information than the raw coefficients do.
However, the canonical loadings are useful to assist in the interpretation of
results. The loadings of the first linear combination are high for most of the
variables in both datasets. Some of the WCY variables have a relatively low
loading (e.g Tax). These variables also have conceptually less relation with
the IPD variables. The second linear combination distinguishes two groups of
variables in both datasets. Most of the variables that have negative loadings
have previously been identified as pro-market variables. And most of the
variables that have positive loadings are associated with pro-business policy.
Based on the raw coefficients, the canonical loadings, and the canonical
correlations we find that (1) the WCY and IPD policy variables have similar
variation (2), and for both datasets, the pro-market and pro-business policy
variables can be distinguished.
Finally, we compute averages for the selection of pro-market variables
and for the selection of pro-business policy variables from the IPD dataset.
Table 1 presents the Pearson correlations for the WCY and IPD pro-market
and pro-business indicators. The indicators are all positively correlated. The
correlation amongst the WCY data is the highest. The correlation between
the policy indicators constructed from the IPD data is 0.53. The pro-business
indicator from WCY has a higher correlation with the IPD pro-business
indicator than with the IPD pro-market indicator. Also, the WCY pro-
market indicator has a higher correlation with the IPD pro-market indicator
than with the IPD pro-business indicator.
Table 1: Correlations between Policy Indicators (WCY 2007-2011 & IPD
2009)
WCY IPD
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WCY Pro-Market 1
Pro-Business 0.82 1
IPD Pro-Market 0.56 0.31 1
Pro-Business 0.44 0.41 0.53 1
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2.4 Extrapolation of Policy Indicators
We are interested in mapping countries’ industrial development path ranging
from countries with low income and a fragile institutional setting to countries
with high income and a strong institutional setting. We construct average
pro-market and pro-business indicators for the 123 countries in the IPD 2009
data using the selection of policy indicators from IPD as discussed in section
2.3. The IPD data contains more less developed countries than the WCY
dataset.
Figure 11: Analysis of Policy Indicators
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Extrapolation of Policy Indicators
The scores of the 123 countries on the pro-market and pro-business indi-
cators are illustrated in Figure 11. As indicated by the legend in the figure,
the countries that we document using the WCY dataset are given a different
label than the countries for which WCY has no data. Overall, the former
group of countries score higher on the policy indicators than the latter group
does. There is a linear relationship between the two policy indicators. This
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result confirms that countries that have a relatively low income level and
weak institutional setting have implemented less industrial policy. For ex-
ample, Peres (2009, p. 192) similarly concludes that “small countries with
less institutional capacity not only should not develop policies of sectoral
scope, but in fact cannot do so”.
3 Industrial Policy and Growth
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
The main objective of industrial policy is to address market failures, to stim-
ulate the development of a competitive industry and to stimulate growth.
As such, the general expectation is that both pro-market and pro-business
policy have a positive impact on economic performance. We study the rela-
tionship between the policy indicators and growth and income level using a
fixed effects model.
The measures used for pro-market and pro-business policy are the average
scores of the pro-market and pro-business variables from the WCY data for
each country and year. For both the growth and the income model we control
for the effect of government consumption, trade openness, level of secondary
school enrollment, and investment. For the growth model we also control for
the level of income in each preceding year. We take the natural logarithm
of GDP when using GDP as the dependent and as the explanatory variable.
The definitions and sources of the control variables are given in Table 10
in the appendix. The estimations are based on an unbalanced dataset for
the years 1995 till 2009. The analysis is based on 56 countries that are
listed in Table 7 in the appendix. Singapore, Taiwan, and the United Arab
Emirates are not included in the analysis because of missing data for the
control variable school enrollment.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
mean sd min max N
Pro-market 0.64 0.19 0.02 1 640
Pro-business 0.5 0.18 0.07 0.96 640
GDP 9.78 0.82 7.36 11.98 640
Growth 2.57 3.76 -13.92 20.41 640
Investment 24.37 5.94 10.4 50.74 640
Openness 85.51 58.53 18.2 392.65 640
Gconsumption 8.67 3 2.58 18.91 640
Education 97.19 20.39 44.23 161.78 640
The summary statistics are presented in Table 2. On average, countries
score higher on pro-market than on pro-business policy. The correlations
between the dependent and the explanatory variables are presented in Table
3. For this sample, the pro-market and pro-business indicators are correlated
0.71. The policy indicators have a low correlation with growth and a positive
correlation with income level.
Table 3: Pairwise Cross-Correlations
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Pro-market 1
Pro-business 0.71 1
GDP 0.53 0.48 1
Growth -0.04 0.03 -0.1 1
Investment -0.12 0.13 -0.09 0.3 1
Openness 0.26 0.32 0.21 0.07 0.17 1
Gconsumption 0.16 0.08 0.11 0.1 -0.01 -0.16 1
Education 0.48 0.33 0.69 -0.09 -0.19 -0.05 0.25 1
3.2 Main Results
In this section, we present the results of a fixed effects model testing the
effect of pro-market and pro-business policy on growth and on income. Table
4 reports the results for growth regressions, and Table 5 reports the results
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for the income regressions. For both tables the preferred model is displayed
in column two.9
Following Table 4 column 2, the policy indicators and the control variables
have a significant effect on growth. The estimated effect of a one standard
deviation increase in pro-business policy leads to a 0.27 standard deviation
increase in growth. However, the estimated effect of a one standard devia-
tion increase in pro-market policy corresponds to a 0.28 standard deviation
decrease in growth.
Table 4 column 3 and 4 presents the results of separate estimations of
the effect of the policy indicators on growth. We find that, when not taking
into account the effect of pro-business policy, the negative estimated effect
of pro-market policy almost halves. When not controlling for the effect of
pro-market policy the effect of pro-business policy turns insignificant and
the coefficient is lower. A possible explanation, for the difference between
the results reported in column 2 and 4, is that pro-market policy has an
important mediating effect on the relation between pro-business policy and
growth. Controlling for the effect of pro-market policy may distinguish high
income countries with a competitive industry that benefit from pro-business
policy from high income countries that do not have a competitive industry
and, as a result, do not benefit from pro-business policy.
Table 5 column 2 reports a significant relation between the explanatory
variables and income level. The model estimates that a one standard devia-
tion increase in pro-business policy corresponds to a 0.04 standard deviation
increase in income. Moreover, the estimated effect of a one standard devia-
tion increase in pro-market policy corresponds to a 0.08 standard deviation
decrease in income. Openness has a high positive effect on income level. This
suggests that countries that have a high level of trade are generally high in-
come countries. Nevertheless, the effect of pro-market policy is negatively
related to income level.
Similar to the results documented for the growth model, columns 3 and
4 in Table 5 report that not controlling for the effect of pro-business policy
on income underestimates the impact of pro-market policy and that not con-
trolling for the effect of pro-market policy may cause researchers to wrongly
conclude that pro-business policy is not significantly related to income. The
policy indicators have opposite partial effects. The correlation between the
policy indicators’ coefficients are negative 0.53 for the growth model and
9On the basis of the parameters used in Table 4 column 2, a Hausman test of the
difference between fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) yields a χ2 value of 232.15
which is significant and thereby supports estimating using a FE model. A Hausman test
of the difference between FE and RE for the income model fails to meet the asymptotic
assumptions of the Hausman test.
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negative 0.52 for the the income model.
Table 4: Regression Results: Dependent Variable Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pro-market -0.065 -0.277** -0.146+
(0.52) (0.00) (0.05)
Pro-business 0.398*** 0.266** 0.110
(0.00) (0.01) (0.18)
Investment 0.651*** 0.692*** 0.649***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Openness 1.597*** 1.641*** 1.568***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gconsumption -0.825*** -0.863*** -0.835***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education 0.520*** 0.525*** 0.535***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP -3.763*** -3.677*** -3.550***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 640 640 640 640
R2 0.027 0.338 0.329 0.326
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 5: Regression Results: Dependent Variable Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pro-market -0.138*** -0.078*** -0.058***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pro-business 0.155*** 0.044*** -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.95)
Investment 0.068*** 0.075*** 0.070***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Openness 0.422*** 0.436*** 0.441***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gconsumption -0.102*** -0.109*** -0.110***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.082***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 640 640 640 640
R2 0.143 0.622 0.614 0.591
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
The aggregated indicators are a cautious measure of the pro-market and
pro-business policy concepts. Moreover, the correlation between the pol-
icy indicators is higher than the average correlation amongst the underlying
variables. In the remainder of this section, we explore the extent to which
the policy indicators’ relationship with growth and income are representative
of the relationship between the policy indicators’ underlying variables and
economic performance.
Two variables are selected to represent the pro-market and pro-business
concepts. We limit the selection of variables to those that contain data for
the earliest year, 1995. We select the variables Investor and Funding because
these variables score highest on each of the orthogonal PCs presented in
Figure 1. Thereby, the results of the PCA in section 2.1 are merely used
as a reference frame to select the variables. Daling and Tamura (1970) find
that the loadings of orthogonal factors can be used to select variables for
regression analysis in order to minimize information overlap. The variables
Investor and Funding have a correlation of 0.31. Investor and pro-market
have a correlation of 0.78 and Funding and pro-business have a correlation
of 0.79.
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Table 6: Regression Results: Variable Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth Growth Growth Income Income Income
Investor -0.119+ -0.128+ -0.045*** -0.050***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00)
Funding 0.294*** 0.298*** 0.065*** 0.069***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Investment 0.625*** 0.667*** 0.631*** 0.054*** 0.066*** 0.057***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Openness 1.545*** 1.623*** 1.524*** 0.387*** 0.432*** 0.392***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Gconsumption -0.841*** -0.889*** -0.807*** -0.103*** -0.120*** -0.093***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education 0.447*** 0.507*** 0.471*** 0.052*** 0.068*** 0.062***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP -3.948*** -3.657*** -3.861***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 640 640 640 640 640 640
R2 0.348 0.328 0.344 0.643 0.610 0.628
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 6 presents the estimation results when estimating using the vari-
ables Investor and Funding. Both variables are significant in all models. In-
vestor has a negative relationship with both growth and income, and Funding
has a positive relationship with both growth and income.10
4 Conclusion
The pro-market and pro-business distinction made by Rodrik and Subra-
manian (2005) is empirically traceable. The pro-market measurement con-
structed captures countries’ degree of implementation of free-market policy,
and the pro-business policy measurement summarizes countries’ degree of
implementation of policy that supports incumbent firms, in particular, in in-
vestment in technology and innovation. Overall, there is no strict opposition
between pro-market and pro-business policy. Rather, countries’ industrial
policy path consists of a gradual implementation of more pro-business and
pro-market policies. This suggests that pro-business policy does not hin-
der the development of a competitive free-market economy. We find that
pro-business policy is an essential part of countries’ overall industrial policy
10The coefficients of Investor and Funding have a low correlation; 0.03 for the growth
model and 0.08 for the income model.
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package and investing in pro-business policy has a positive effect on economic
development.
Researchers not controlling for the effect of pro-business policy may un-
derestimate the negative impact of pro-market policy on growth and income.
Furthermore, researchers not controlling for the effect of pro-market policy
may not find a significant result when testing the relationship between pro-
business policy and economic development.
This study would benefit from further analysis comparing the perception-
based policy data with qualitative data describing policy outcome. In addi-
tion, further analysis on the relationship between policy and institutions is
needed in order to better understand countries’ policy constraints.
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5 Appendix
Table 7: Country List
Code Country
ARG Argentina JPN Japan
AUS Australia KAZ Kazakhstan
AUT Austria KOR Korea, South
BEL Belgium LTU Lithuania
BGR Bulgaria LUX Luxembourg
BRA Brazil MEX Mexico
CAN Canada MYS Malaysia
CHE Switzerland NLD Netherlands
CHL Chile NOR Norway
CHN China NZL New Zealand
COL Colombia PER Peru
CZE Czech Republic PHL Philippines
DEU Germany POL Poland
DNK Denmark PRT Portugal
ESP Spain QAT Qatar
EST Estonia ROM Romania
FIN Finland RUS Russia
FRA France SGP Singapore
GBR United Kingdom SVK Slovakia
GRC Greece SVN Slovenia
HKG Hong Kong SWE Sweden
HRV Croatia THA Thailand
HUN Hungary TUR Turkey
IDN Indonesia TWN Taiwan
IND India UAE United Arab Emirates
IRL Ireland UKR Ukraine
ISL Iceland USA United States
ISR Israel VEN Venezuela
ITA Italy ZAF South Africa
JOR Jordan
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Table 8: WCY 1995-2011
Pro-Business Development Policy
Exchange: Exchange rates support the competitiveness of enterprises (1997-2011)
Research: Laws relating to scientific research do encourage innovation (2004-2011)
Regulation: Technological regulation supports business development and innovation
(2005-2011)
Funding: Funding for technological development is readily available (1995-2011)
Ventures: Public and private sector ventures are supporting technological develop-
ment (2007-2011)
Legal: Development and application of technology are supported by the legal envi-
ronment (1997-2011)
Labour: Labour regulations (hiring/firing practices, minimum wages, etc.) do not
hinder business activities (1995-2011)
Creation: Creation of firms is supported by legislation (2002-2011)
Ease: Ease of doing business is supported by regulations (2003-2011)
Framework: The legal and regulatory framework encourages the competitiveness of
enterprises (1997-2011)
Tax: Real corporate taxes do not discourage entrepreneurial activity (1997-2011)
Environment: Environmental laws and compliance do not hinder the competitiveness
of businesses (1995-2011)
Pro-Market Development Policy
Immigration: Immigration laws do not prevent your company from employing foreign
labor (1995-2011)
Competition: Competition legislation is efficient in preventing unfair competition
(1995-2011)
Ownership: State ownership of enterprises is not a threat to business activities (2007-
2011)
Subsidies: Subsidies do not distort fair competition and economic development (2003-
2011)
Incentive: Investment incentives are attractive to foreign investors (2007-2011)
Market: Capital markets (foreign and domestic) are easily accessible (2004-2011)
Investor: Foreign investors are free to acquire control in domestic companies (1995-
2011)
Contract: Public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bidders (1995-2011)
Protection: Protectionism does not impair the conduct of your business (1995-2011)
Customs: Customs’ authorities do facilitate the efficient transit of goods (1997-2011)
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Table 9: IPD 2009
Pro-Business Development Policy
A5033: Government support for private or public research & development (1-4)
B3022: Existence of targeted support measures for emerging growth sectors (0-4)
B5010: Existence of institutions or arrangements to support research and technolog-
ical acquisitions for SMEs (0-4)
B5011: Existence of institutions or arrangements to support research and technolog-
ical acquisitions for large firms (0-4)
B5012: Existence of institutions or arrangements to encourage technology transfers
and skills transfers from foreign players to domestic players (0-4)
C5010: Government venture capital incentives (0-4)
Pro-Market Development Policy
B6031: Effectiveness of enforcement of international TRIPS arrangements for the
protection of intellectual property (0-4)
B7020: Effectiveness of competition regulation arrangements (non-banking) to com-
bat restrictive collective agreements i.e. cartels (0-4)
B7021: Effectiveness of competition regulation arrangements (non-banking) to com-
bat abuses of dominant positions (0-4)
B8002: Restrictions on the issue of import licenses (1-4)
C6020: Publication requirement for firms issuing shares (0-4)
C7010: Existence of competition arrangements in the banking system to combat
restrictive collective agreements i.e. cartels (0-4)
C7011: Existence of competition arrangements in the banking system to combat abuse
of dominant position (0-4)
C8000: Openness of bank capital to foreign shareholding (0-4)
C8001: Right of establishment for foreign deposit banks and investment banks (0-4)
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Table 10: Sources
Variable Definition Source Scale
Pro-Market
and pro-
Business
Policy
Policy indicators IMD (2011) Indicators are nor-
malized on a scale
of 0 to 1.
Pro-Market
and pro-
Business
Policy
Policy indicators IPD (2009) Indicators are nor-
malized on a scale
of 0 to 1.
GDP Real GDP per
capita (Constant
Prices: Chain
series)
Heston, Summers,
and Aten (2011)
Growth Growth rate of Real
GDP per capita
(Constant Prices:
Chain series)
Heston, Summers,
and Aten (2011)
Logarithmic change
Openness Openness at 2005
constant prices
Heston, Summers,
and Aten (2011)
% of GDP
Investment Investment Share
of PPP Converted
GDP Per Capita
at 2005 constant
prices (Laspeyres
series)
Heston, Summers,
and Aten (2011)
% of GDP
Gconsumption Government Con-
sumption Share
of PPP Converted
GDP Per Capita
at 2005 constant
prices (Laspeyres
series)
Heston, Summers,
and Aten (2011)
% of GDP
Education Secondary school
enrollment
World Bank (2011) % of gross enroll-
ment ratio
Property Property Rights Heritage Founda-
tion
From low property
rights protection =
0 to high property
rights protection =
1
Corruption Freedom from cor-
ruption
Heritage Founda-
tion
From lack of free-
dom from corrup-
tion = 0 to high
freedom from cor-
ruption = 1
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